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Abstract
I analyze the links between talent migration and cross-country inequality by exploiting the
1995 elimination of mobility restrictions on the European football labor market. I develop a
simple model and employ an empirical dataset to estimate its parameters. Through simulation
analysis, I compare actual data with a counterfactual no-mobility restriction trajectory, and con-
clude that the elimination of mobility barriers increases not only cross-country inequality by
25%, but also global output in the football economy by stimulating the production of new talent
in Africa, Latin and Central America.
Keywords: International Migration, Brain Drain, free mobility, Inequality, European Foot-
ball.
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1 Introduction
The market for talent is becoming increasingly globalized. From 1990 to 2000, the stock of high-
skilled migrants to 30 OECD countries rose from 12.5 to 20 million (Docquier, Lowell, and Mar-
fouk, 2009). As such, there is greater propensity for elite workers, such as engineers, physicians,
and researchers, to migrate (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). However, the main issue is how glob-
alization affects inequality. The answer to this question is complex, as the link between migration
and inequality is bi-directional (de la Croix and Docquier, 2012). Income differentials induce mi-
gration, which affects cross-country inequality. In turn, migration affects cross-country inequality
because migrants tend to be highly skilled, as opposed to workers who do not migrate, both do-
mestically and in foreign countries. Furthermore, lack of availability of long-term longitudinal
data on migration size and structure, as well as the absence of quantitative data on migration
policies, makes it difficult to identify the mechanisms at work.
This paper is a step toward investigating the effects of talent migration on inequality across
countries by focusing on the European football labor market. The football market offers four
significant advantages for the study of mobility and inequality. First, professional football is a
small but very visible segment of the highly skilled labor market, as a significant proportion of
the world’s population closely follows this sport. As a result, any significant change in the set of
rules governing football hierarchy is of interest per se.
Second, professional football has one of the most globalized labor markets. Since the mid-
1970s, an increasing number of talented players have moved across countries and continents to
(re-)join the top European leagues. By 2010, about 50% of the world’s most talented players are
employed in a foreign country. This percentage is substantial compared to the global average
emigration rate of college-educated workers, which is only around 6% (Docquier, Lowell and
Marfouk, 2009). Consequently, similar to Kleven et al.’s (2013) analysis, the patterns observed
in the football market are likely to provide an upper limit for the migration inequality response
to the elimination of mobility restrictions for highly skilled workers and its impact on the global
economy.
Third, a unique panel dataset on European male footballers’ mobility since 1974 can be ex-
ploited. This allows identifying the most talented players by country of origin, documenting
international mobility, and building metrics for leagues and national team performance. Limited
theoretical models have studied the interactions between the brain-drain and global inequality.
Although existing models are all calibrated to match data, it is still unclear whether the imple-
mented specifications are the most appropriate, or if their micro-foundations are well supported
empirically (see de la Croix and Docquier, 2012; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). This paper con-
tributes to this literature by developing an endogenous migration decisions model exploiting data
features and estimating its structural parameters based on country-specific characteristics.
Fourth, the crucial advantage of analyzing the football market is that a significant and unex-
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pected policy reform was implemented in 1995, drastically changing the migration patterns of
talented players. This reform, known as the Bosman rule, considerably eased player transfers by
eliminating transfer fees for out-of-contract players wishing to change clubs within the European
Union (EU) and banning the inclusion of EU citizens in "foreign player" quotas. Consequently,
mobility of both European and non-European players across European clubs increased.
The use of a quasi-natural experiment, i.e., the Bosman rule, allows quantifying the effect of
a liberalization of migration shocks on cross-country inequality. Specifically, I develop a random
utility model for the football players’ decision to migrate to certain leagues, where each player’s
utility depends on both the characteristics of the targeted foreign league and moving cost. I also
assume a production technology for the output of each European league and national team, re-
lating the relative quality of each country to the number of talented players and their average
skill level. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first model that characterizes the migration
technology of talented football players in a panel setting.
My empirical estimations show the following. On one hand, the decision to migrate for a tal-
ented player is affected by common variables, such as income per capita in both country of origin
and destination, geographical distance, and colonial links. On the other hand, one of the key fac-
tors is the prestige/quality of the destination league. Furthermore, I show that the total number
of talented players is a key determinant of average league performance, and the total number
of talented players weighted by the score of their employment league is a key determinant of
national team performance.
Moreover, my structural model also allows quantifying the impact of the Bosman rule on tal-
ent training and production, and I find that it spurs these in poorer regions, such as Africa, Central
and South America (except in Argentina and Brazil). However, I do not identify such incentive ef-
fects in European or Asian countries. This final finding corroborates the brain-gain theory (Beine
et al., 2011; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012) according to which skill-biased emigration prospects
affect national talent production in poorer countries.
Subsequently, I conduct counterfactual simulations to assess Bosman rule’s effect on player
mobility, their geographic concentration, efficiency, and inequality of leagues and national teams.
I show that the Bosman rule led to an improvement in world football quality as measured by
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and Federation Internationale de Football As-
sociation (FIFA) scores. European football average quality improved by 12% in 2010, and the
national teams’ average quality by 20%. This result originated from the incentive training mech-
anism developed by the introduction of the Bosman rule as discussed in the counterfactual anal-
ysis. Moreover, the Bosman rule increased inequality across European leagues and decreased
inequality across national teams. On one hand, the latter effect seems to be mainly caused by the
removal of mobility barriers, which may have reinforced the concentration of best talents in top
European leagues and, thus, amplified the difference in quality between the top and the rest of the
European leagues. On the other hand, migrant players may have improved their skills by playing
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in higher quality leagues. Consequently, this may have helped their respective national teams to
perform better. These effects are sizeable; the Gini index of UEFA scores shows an increase of 25%
in cross-country inequality between European leagues from 1998 to 2010, whereas cross-country
inequality between national teams fell by 70% on average during the same period.
This paper is also linked to the sport economics literature that focused on the effects of global-
ization of European soccer on game quality and national teams’ inequality like Milanovic (2005),
who use data from World Cup performances, the Champions League, and Italian Series A League.
He finds that, consistent with his model, as the market globalized (i) the concentration of quality
for teams participating in the Champions League had increased steadily since 1983, (ii) rich clubs
from north Italy displaced poor clubs from the south starting in the 1990s, and (iii) inequality
in national teams’ performance in World Cups had decreased starting in the 1980s. Frick (2009)
explores the effects of Bosman rule in migration and its effects to the national teams. Radoman
(2017) analyzes the analyzes the impact of Bosman ruling, on the productivity of new entrants to
the English Premier League. My study contributes to this literature not only through quantifying
the Bosman rule’s effects in inequality and efficiency of the national teams and European leagues
through the counterfactual analysis but also through showing the Bosman rule’s impact on the
production of new talents across different regions, which is the major source of efficiency gain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data development,
Section 3 describes the theoretical model, and Section 4 its parametrization and illustrates a quasi-
experiment. Finally, I present my conclusions in Section 5.
2 Data development
In this section, I describe the database, which includes the location of talent, bilateral migration
stocks, the performance of national leagues and national teams, and other data sources used to
estimate the framework’s equations.
A good indicator of an athlete’s talent is if he is considered "the best" in his country of origin,
while simultaneously being recognized not only by football professionals but also by the general
public. The definition of talent in literature varies. A widely-used definition of "talented player"
considers players among the 23 selected to represent their national teams in the FIFA competition,
according to FIFA regulations (see Frick, 2009; Berlinschi et al., 2013). For instance Berlinschi et al.
(2013) consider a talented player as one who participates in national teams for two different years
even if the team’s composition changed over time. Additionally, Frick (2009) defines talent by
only considering the 23 players selected into the national team for competition. Another strand
of literature defines "talented players" as those who play in major leagues (see Kleven et al., 2013
and Radoman, 2017). Furthermore, the sports literature defines "talent" as a highly valued athlete
based on team supporters’ preferences (see Rosen, 1981).
In this paper, I define a talented player as one who has at least three appearances in one of the
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best 65 national teams during a World Cup year. This definition has the advantage to incorporate
the definition of talent consistency for outstanding performances. Talented players are those who
"regularly" represent their national teams and not simply participate once.
My analysis focuses on the nine World Cup years, from 1978 to 2010 (the World Cup takes
place every four years). Talented football players make more appearances in these years because
(i) trainers use their best players, (ii) there are more matches played for the World Cup qualifica-
tion and final stages, and (iii) all highly ranked football-playing nations play a similar number of
games. I select the best 65 countries based on the 2011 FIFA rankings. These include 21 UEFA core
countries, 29 non-EU countries (mainly from Africa and Latin America), and 15 Eastern European
countries. The latter group includes 12 new countries created after 1990 (three of them were for-
mer countries: ex-USSR [split in 1991]; ex-Yugoslavia [split in 1991)], and ex-Czechoslovakia [split
in 1993]).
The utilized key variables are as follows:
• I denote by Nijt the number of talented players (talents) originating from the national team
i and employed in league j during World Cup year t. The data are provided by Benjamin
Starck-Zimmermann and the CIES Football Observatory, which records the names of play-
ers appearing in their national team, their number of appearances, and their club of employ-
ment on an annual basis. The total number of talents originating from country i is given by
NTit =
∑




• I denote by Qit the quality/score of national team i in year t. The data are provided by the
official FIFA website and start from 1994.1 However, the rules do change over the years. To
make results comparable, I standardize scores, dividing the FIFA score of each country in
my dataset by Spain’s score, Spin, for the same year. I choose Spain because it is the last
World Cup winner in my sample. This normalization makes the variable more stationary
and comparable over time, and has no incidence on the result.
• I denote by qjt the quality/score of league j in year t. I measure the league’s quality by its
UEFA score. The data are available from 1978 to 2010, but only for the European leagues.2
To make the results comparable, I standardize the league score. For the national teams’
scores, I divide each league’s annual reported UEFA score by Spain’s score. I choose the
Spanish league as the basis of normalization because Spain is the best European league in
the 2010 UEFA ranking. UEFA’s score is based on the total number of points accumulated
in European club competitions by clubs in each league over the past five years. For each
1See http://fr.fifa.com/worldranking/rankingtable/index.html. This measure is constructed from FIFA to capture the
quality of the national teams and it is used extensively in the literature (Ericson, 2000;Berlinschi et al. 2013).
2There can be alternative measures of league quality such as the number of tickets "sold". I find that the correlation
between the number of tickets with the league’s performance is high. In a sample of seven leagues from 1978 to 2010, I
conclude that the correlation between the two variables was around 0.77.
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country, it is computed as the sum of all points obtained by participating teams and then
divided by the number of clubs. Points are assigned according to specific parameters, such
as 1) the number of games played by a team, 2) the number of teams qualified in second and
following rounds, and 3) the number of goals scored by a team in the entire competition.3
Other variables I also use a number of variables to estimate the model. Data on geographic dis-
tance, colonial links, and linguistic proximity are taken from the CEPII database (see Clair et al.,
2004). UEFA authorities provided data on average wages. Specifically, I collected average wages
for 21 EU leagues from 1978 to 2010 from their UEFA archives. To include leagues outside Europe
in the regressions, I input missing salaries by using a regression of average salary and income
per capita. As shown below, this is a reasonable strategy, since the correlation between these two
variables is particularly high.4 This strategy allows me to avoid large scale differences when us-
ing income per capita as a proxy of wages for the missing salaries. I collect the data for income
per capita from World Bank indicators. The wages are deflated by the national price indices.As
a result, I use real wages in my analysis. Additionally, I include a proxy for institutional quality
from Polity IV, which covers the period from 1978 to 2010 for the 65 countries in my sample. Fur-
thermore, the marginal tax rates for soccer players are provided by Kleven et al. (2013) and are
limited only to 14 EU countries for the same period. As Kleven et al. (2013) claim, considering the
top marginal tax rates has the advantage to be uncorrelated with salary levels. Finally, I calculate
the training variable as follows: I record the number of stadiums and training centers for each of
the 65 countries/leagues in the sample from 1978 to 2010. I construct this variable using the offi-
cial websites of each country’s club and using Wikipedia to find the year the stadium was built,
used, closed, or re-opened.
3 Football Economy
Quantifying the Bosman rule effect requires modeling interdependencies between migration and
football economy performances. I first develop a simple micro-founded model that highlights
how the mechanisms of underlying migration decisions and inequality characterized the football
market’s function. I also endogenize the football players’ training decisions, which govern the
3Data for the quality index of leagues are only available from 1978 onwards, and data on qjt only for EU leagues. To
proxy the score of non-EU leagues, I adopt the following procedure: I regress the European national teams’ scores on the
quality/score of their league and identify a linear relationship. I subsequently proxy the quality/score of the league of
non-EU countries by using this linear equation. Hence, I have two samples: the 1978–2010 balanced group of EU-to-EU
countries and another group that includes both the balanced group and the 1978 to 2010 group of all-to-EU countries.
EU-to-EU means that the country of origin is in the EU as is the destination. On the other hand, all-to-EU represents the
country of origin for players from all over the world with a EU destination. The linear combination between the leagues’
and national teams’ scores is qi,t = 0.6397Qi,t − 0.0237. The regression explains 30% of the variation in the league’s
quality/score. The average correlation between the leagues’ and national teams’ scores between 1994 and 2010 is 0.58, but
it gradually increases over time. This proxy allows me to increase the sample for the migration equation and provide a
robustness analysis.




Many studies investigate the size and structure determinants of labor mobility between countries.
To endogenize migration decisions, most recent research is built on a multinomial discrete choice
model without spatial correlation in unobserved factors (Beine et al., 2011; Grogger and Hanson,
2011; Kennan and Walker, 2011; Canaday and Tamura,2009). I use similar micro-foundations to
analyze the determinants of talented players’ mobility.
Each country i produces a number NTit of talented players with heterogeneous preferences.
The utility of a player from country i deciding to play in league j is the sum of a deterministic
component, depending on the destination league’s characteristics and an individual-specific ran-
dom term, which captures the soccer players’ heterogeneous attitudes and incentives. Possible
determinants include the average wage level (wjt), the prestige of the league (measured by its
standardized UEFA score, qjt), a vector ajt of amenities (capturing quality of life, the size of the
total diaspora, league rules, quality of stadium and infrastructure, etc.), and mobility costs cijt ≥
0 if league j differs from country i (it is assumed that ciit = 0). I assume that the deterministic util-
ity component is logarithmic. I also assume that the random term εjt follows an iid extreme-value
distribution and it has the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Thus, it is
independent of the observed attributes. I omit player subscripts for clarity.
The utility of a player from country i who remains and plays in league i at time t is given by
uiit = θ lnwit + δ ln qit + ρ ln ait + εiit,
where(θ, δ, ρ) is a vector of preference parameters.
The utility for the same player moving to league j at time t accounts for moving costs (cijt).
These costs capture psychological and integration costs, monetary costs (which can be partly
covered by the player’s team of employment), as well as screening costs (the effort of contacting
foreign employers and obtaining a visa) and quotas.6
The utility of moving to league j is given by
uijt = θ lnwjt + δ ln qjt + ρ ln ajt + ln(1− cijt) + εijt,
where cijt denotes bilateral migration cost, modeled here as an "iceberg" cost, and it includes
5In the Web Appendix, I analyze the mechanisms of underlying migration decisions and inequality in a two-league
setting, and I consider the Bosman rule’s impact on the football economy.
6Some federations (especially the European leagues) impose restrictions on the employment of foreign players. For
instance, a football player must fulfill two conditions to play in the English league: he must play 75% of his national
team’s matches and his national team’s rank must be greater than the 70th FIFA position. Football clubs in Norway need
to demonstrate that having a foreign player would improve the league and club’s level. The Spanish league does not
allow more than three non-EU players per club.
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all the various types of costs previously discussed. I use the McFadden theorem (McFadden,
1984), which is when the random term follows an iid extreme-value distribution, where the prob-




= Pr [uijt = Maxkuikt]
=
exp [θ lnwjt + δ ln qjt + ρ ln ajt + ln(1− cijt)]∑
k exp [θ lnwkt + δ ln qkt + ρ ln akt + ln(1− cikt)] .




exp [θ lnwjt + δ ln qjt + ρ ln ajt + ln(1− cijt)]













The bilateral emigration rate (ratio of emigrants to stayers) is a function of differentials in
wages, prestige levels, amenities, and net migration costs.
3.2 Technologies
3.2.1 Production Function of Leagues
Another strand of literature examines the impact of immigration on economic performance and
welfare in destination countries (see recent works by Borjas, 2003; Card, 2009; Docquier et al.,
2015). Similarly, I use a simplified version of their models to build the technology of leagues.
Each league has many homogeneous clubs characterized by the same production function. The




where Ajt is the scale productivity factor in league j in year t, ljt ≡
∑
iNijt is the total number of
talented players employed in the league, and γ is the elasticity of the leagues’ score to the number
of talented players.
3.2.2 Production Function of National Teams
Each nation has a national team that participates in the different FIFA competitions. Each na-
tional team is composed by the most talented players in the country, regardless of the league in
which they employed. Talented players improve their skills when playing in better leagues. For
simplicity, the talented player’s skill is assumed to be proportional to the average quality of the
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league in which he is employed. I denote by Lit ≡
∑
j Nijtqijt the total amount of skills available
to the national team i at time t.Berlinschi et al. (2013) construct a similar index. They weight each
migrant with the ranking of the league in which employed.The performance of this national team




where Bit is the scale productivity factor in country i in year t, and φ is the elasticity of the
national teams’ scores to the total amount of skills used by the national team.
3.3 Endogenous Training decisions
Recent literature shows that skill-based migration prospects affect expected returns to schooling
and, thus, incentives to acquire education (see Mountford, 1997; Beine et al., 2011; Theocharidis,
2014). However, the direction is ambiguous. On one hand, individuals have more incentive to
invest ex-ante in education due to higher returns to schooling. On the other hand, some of them
migrate, thus decreasing the average number of skilled workers in the country of origin. There is
a net brain gain once the first effect dominates.
In the same line, I assess whether the elimination of mobility barriers-the Bosman rule-induces
more football players to train harder and become more talented. The Bosman rule has changed
football players’ migration patterns, by reducing migration hurdles and increasing talent "ex-
portability." As a result, it may have increased in the players’ incentives to acquire skills. Many
growth models with human capital assume that human capital during period t + 1 is described
by a Cobb-Douglas function, which depends on the level of human capital and on the level of
investment in schooling at a given time t (see Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, Tamura,





exp (ξit) , (4)
where Zit is a scale factor, characterizing the training technology of country i in year t; σ is a
technological parameter capturing inertia in the number of talents (one period is four years and
a career lasts longer than four years); and ξit is the proportion of young players (aged, e.g., 16 to
20) who train to become talented professional players at time t + 1 (the exponential form is used
for mathematical simplicity).
Becoming a professional football player requires training, but extra effort lnE is needed to
become a talented professional football player. This level of effort is heterogeneous across young
players and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Players decide how much effort to put into training
without knowing their future migration inclinations (i.e., the level of individual-specific random
term εjt+1, which is an extreme value distributed in the ex-post utility function). Based on de
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Palma and Kilani (2007), who show that under the Type I Extreme Value distribution, the uncon-
ditional and conditional distributions of maximum utility coincide, I assume that the expected





where lnvijt = θlnwjt + δlnqjt + ρlnajt. I also denote the expected utility of a "regular" (non-
talented) player as vet+1 = lnvot. I assume that regular players stay in their home countries.
Players decide to train if ln
∑
j e
[lnvijt+ln(1−cijt)] − lnE > lnvot. It becomes straightforward to







The proportion depends on the magnitude and distribution of bilateral migration costs; as
bilateral migration costs decrease, the expected return to training increases, and more players
invest in training. Substituting (5) into (4) and taking the logs yields:
ln(NTit+1) = lnZit + σlnN
T
it + ξit (6)











Finally, I consider the following equilibrium for my "football economy":




∀i, and set of exogenous vari-
ables, {wit, ait, Ait, Bit}∀it and {cijt}∀ijt, an inter-temporal equilibrium is a set of year-specific vectors{
NTit , qit, Qit
}
∀it and matrices {Nijt}∀ijt satisfying migration optimality conditions (1), technological






4 Quantitative Analysis and parametrization
This section presents the identification strategy and empirical estimation for each equation of the
theoretical framework as set out in the previous section. By estimating each equation, I find elas-
ticities using all sources of variation in migration decisions, quality/score of leagues, national
teams’ scores, and the number of talents in all leagues over time. Subsequently, I conduct a coun-
terfactual analysis and quantify the effects of the Bosman rule in the inequality and efficiency of




In this subsection, I develop the identification strategy to estimate the Eq. (1), which presents the
migration decisions of soccer players. The Bosman rule affects migration costs; consequently, for
simplicity, I consider that ĉijt denotes the pre-Bosman level of migration costs and the Bosman
rule multiplied (1 − cijt) by a constant. Therefore, I write the migration’s cost of Eq. (1) as (1 −
cijt) = (1− ĉijt). exp(λBOSt), where λ is a parameter and BOSt is a variable equal to zero in the
pre-Bosman period and equal to one after the Bosman rule. Then, Eq. (1) can be expressed as:
Nijt
Niit












Particularly, using data on the bilateral migration of players (Nijt) and real wage levels for
leagues (wjt), measuring the league’s prestige (qjt) by its standardized UEFA score, I estimate the
parameters of the structural Eq. (8). The migration costs are not observable. Following empirical
literature on migration, I allow migration costs to increase with the log of the geographic distance
between countries (dij), and decrease with linguistic proximity (lij) and with the existence of
colonial links between countries (sij). I also control for polity (polityjt) at destination to capture
the possible quality of institutions at destination as an attraction for soccer players. The intuition
is that several developing countries face political instability and, thus, football players might
emigrate to a country/league with better institutions. Additionally, I control for marginal tax
rates at destination. Finally, migration costs are affected by the Bosman rule, BOSt. Since 1995,
European football players have been allowed to move without any legal restriction within Europe,
and restrictions on non-EU players have been attenuated. Hence, I include a Bosman dummy
(BOSt) in the set of regressors.











+β1 ln dij + β2lij + β3sij + ψpolityjt + µ ln(1− taxjt) + αmi + αmj + f(t) + εmi,t,(9)







fixed effects for origin and destination countries, f(t) is a B-spline function that captures the
nonlinear time trend, and εmi,t is the error term typically assumed to be statistically independent
of regressors. The fixed effects, together with the distance and Bosman variables, control for un-
observed characteristics and migration costs. The main coefficients of interest are δ and λ. Other
explanatory variables are time invariant and exogenous. I cannot estimate Eq.(9) by including
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both time-fixed effects and the Bosman dummy because of multi-collinearity. To identify this
dummy variable’s effect on migration flows, I estimate Eq. (9) using a non-linear time trend by a
polynomial of t, f(t), the B-spline method, which substitutes the year-fixed effects approach. This
nonparametric method captures the common year-effects before and after the adoption of the
Bosman rule, as the institutional changes in the champion’s league occurring in 1992, the increase
in TV rights and wages, which increased in all the leagues after 2003 (see Kessene, 2009).
I also include the marginal tax rates in Eq. (9) to control different taxation policies for soccer
players or foreign workers, which alternated in a few countries before and after 1995 (see Kleven
et al., 2013), such as the Belgian reform in 2002, the Danish reform in 1992, and the Spanish reform
in 2004.7 The correlation between real wages and marginal tax rates was small (0.02), ruling out a
risk of collinearity between these two variables when I included both in Eq. (9).
As far as estimation is concerned, the OLS-FE regression technique is likely to yield inconsis-
tent estimates of the coefficients because of the presence of a high proportion of zero values (83%)
in bilateral migration stocks (Nijt). Estimating the gravity model (9) with OLS-FE led to the exclu-
sion of numerous country pairs. If the country pairs with zero flows have a different population
distribution from pairs with positive flows, this exclusion generates a selection bias.Additionally,
as it is clearly identified by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), it is possible the variance of εmi,t to
depend on its covariates of NijtNiit and then, its expected value will also depend on some of the
regressors in the presence of zeros. This, in turn, invalidates one important assumption of consis-
tency of OLS estimates. The use of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator,
allows us to include the zero values for the dependent variable, and rules out any selection bias of
this kind. Therefore, I use Poisson regressions as in other studies on trade and bilateral migration
(Beine et al., 2008, 2011; Tenreyro, 2007). Moreover, the standard errors of Eq.(9) are clustered by
country of origin and destination.
Finally, estimation of Eq.(9) may also be subject to a reverse causality problem. The reason is
that, while migration has an impact on the league’s quality, it also likely depends on the league’s
prestige. In practice, it is not obvious that this problem is severe. The total immigration and
emigration affect league quality. On average, each bilateral pair accounted for a relatively small
fraction of total migration stocks. Nevertheless, I address the reverse-causality problem by using
IV-Poisson and instrumenting the log ratio of the leagues’ scores by their lagged value.
7Since 2002, international football and basketball players in Belgium (playing in either first or second league) have the
option of paying a flat income tax rate of 18% instead of the regular progressive income tax schedule with very high rates
at the top. Conversely, in 1992, Denmark enacted a special tax scheme for foreign researchers and high-income foreigners
in all other professions, who signed employment contracts in Denmark after June 1, 1991. The Spanish reform is known
as "Beckham Law." The "Beckham Law" (Royal Decree 687/2005) is a particular tax scheme passed in 2005, applicable to
foreign workers having moved to Spain after January 1, 2004.
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4.1.2 League Production Function.
To estimate the parameters of the production function Eq. (2), I use standardized data on league
scores and data on the distribution of talented players. I model scale productivity factors by
using country- and time-fixed effects, which capture the individual league characteristics and the
common changes that happen to all leagues, such as reforms in the fundamental form of European
competitions. Taking the log of Eq. (2) yields:













are the vectors of fixed effects and εqjt is the error term. First, I estimate this equa-
tion by OLS-FE. As previously explained, OLS might be subject to a reverse-causality bias. In-
deed, the league’s quality impacts migration decisions and the total number of immigrants and
emigrants. I address this problem by using IV regressions and employ two different instruments.
Similarly to Beine et al., (2008), I use firstly the lagged number of talented players. Secondly,
following Feyrer (2009), Beine and Parsons, (2015) and Docquier et al. (2016) I instrument migra-
tion stocks using predicted migration stocks obtained from a "zero stage," pseudo-gravity regres-
sion that includes interactions between year dummies and the geographic distance between each
country of origin and each destination. The pseudo-gravity model is:
lnNijt = βt ln dij + νXij + ai + aj + at + εi,t, (11)
where the vector Xij is a set of controls, such as colonial relationship and linguistic proximity,
and ai aj ,at are the origin, destination, and year fixed effects. In the pseudo-gravity stage, the
high prevalence of zero values in bilateral migration stocks gives rise to econometric concerns
about possible inconsistent OLS estimates. To address this problem, I use the Poisson regression
by pseudo-maximum likelihood (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).8
4.1.3 National Production Function
To estimate the parameters of the production function Eq.(3), I use standardized data on national
teams’ scores and on the distribution of talented players. I model scale productivity factors by
using country- and time-fixed effects. I obtain the following empirical specification by taking the














are the vectors of fixed effects and εQjt is the error term. Initially, Eq. (12) was
estimated by OLS-FE. I address the reverse causality problem by using IV regressions and employ
8In the Web appendix, I explain the methodology of constructing this instrument.
13
two different instruments. The first instrument is the lagged variable of lnLjt. The second one,
used for robustness, are the predicted migration stocks obtained from a zero-stage pseudo-gravity
regression as in Beine and Parsons, (2015), and Docquier et al. (2016), weighted for the league’s
score.
4.1.4 Training Equation
I develop the empirical model for the training equation from the micro-founded condition (Eq.
(7)) and, since the Bosman rule decreases migration costs, I consider that (1 − cijt) = (1 −
ĉijt). exp(λBOSt) as in the migration equation. Then, Eq. (7) becomes

















(1− ĉijt). exp(λ), where C2it could be proxied by regional dummies,
so that







Since I use a beta-convergence specification (i.e., I subtract lnNTit from the right- and left-
hand sides and use β0 = σ − 1 in Eq. (15). This convergence regression model is in line with
Beine et al.’s (2008) specification. I include the log change in the total number of country-specific
talented players on its lagged value and a Bosman dummy in the regression model. I allow the
Bosman effect to vary across different regions. Specifically, I distinguish Europe, Africa, Central
and South America, and Brazil and Argentina. Brazil and Argentina (referred to as BA), the two
countries outside of Europe that have strong leagues and national teams before the Bosman rule,
are distinguished from the group of other Latin American countries. I account for unobserved
heterogeneity by adding a full set of country- and time-fixed effects and some controls, such as
training (trainit) and polity (polityit). I include the last two variables to capture the countries’
possible training investments and governance quality:









ϕrBOStdir + θ1polityit + θ2 ln trainit + ε
N
it (15)






is the vector of fixed effects,
β0 is the convergence parameter expected to lie between -1 and 0, dir is a dummy equal to one if
country i belongs to region r and 0 otherwise, and ϕr is a coefficient capturing the incentive effect
induced by the Bosman rule in region r. My set of control variables includes institutional quality
and the leagues and clubs’ training expenditures. As a benchmark, I estimate this equation using
OLS-FE. The OLS regression model assumes that all covariates are independent of the error term.
Although fixed effects control for possible misspecification caused by unobserved characteristics,
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they do not account for other potential sources of regressor endogeneity.
Endogeneity arises because of the presence of the lagged term on the right-hand side. The
use of fixed effects and AR terms lead to estimation inconsistency (Nickell, 1981). As such, it
is preferable to use two-stage least-squares (2SLS) methods and instruments lnNi,t−1, with their
lagged values. Furthermore, as Caselli et al. (1996) argue, empirical studies on convergence are
plagued by the incorrect treatment of country-fixed effects. It is usually assumed that these effects
are uncorrelated with the other right-side variables. The fixed effects αNi is used as a determinant
of the log-change number of talented players. By construction, it is also a determinant of the
lagged term, which is the regressor in the equation. Hence, the assumption of uncorrelated fixed
effects is violated in dynamic panel regressions. It is desirable to correct for this collinearity bias
even if I use fixed effects as control variables.
To solve this problem, I use Arellano and Bond’s (1991) approach to developing a general-
ized method of moments (GMM) estimator using all moment conditions. This method suggests
eliminating country-fixed effects using differences. The equation can be rewritten as:
∆ lnNTit = α
N





ϕr∆BOStdir + θ1∆polityit + θ2∆ ln trainit + ε
N
it , (16)




Table 1 presents the results of estimating Eq. (9) using different samples and estimation methods.
Columns (1)-(3) report the results of the main sample, which it contains a set of origin and des-
tination leagues of 21 European core countries from 1978 to 2010 . Columns (4)-(5) highlight the
results of estimating Eq. (9) for a larger sample covering the 1978 to 1994 EU-to-EU countries and
the 1994-2010 All-to-EU countries. Also, Columns (1)-(2) and Columns (4)-(5) present the Poisson
approach and Column (3) reports the IV-Poisson method results.
Most regressions explain more than 50% of the variation in the observed migration flows, thus
ensuring an excellent fit, given that the migration rates are very heterogeneous across corridors.
The main explanatory variables’ coefficients are significant and have intuitive signs. The coeffi-
cients are stable across estimations and different samples. Precisely, the prestige ratio variable is
significant. Moreover, its coefficient is positive, and lies between 0.43 and 1.31 (see Columns (1) to
(5)). The latter implies that a 1% increase in the prestige ratio led to an increase of 0.4% to 1.31% in
the migration flows between the two countries. Similarly, the wage ratio’s coefficient lies between
0.82 and 1.2. Conversely, the larger the geographic distance between origin and destination, the
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lower the migration flows are. Moreover, the language variable is not significant in most regres-
sions, probably because the soccer industry overcomes linguistic problems. Football teams either
hire translators or allow players to communicate in their native language. Additionally, colonial
links are not significant, inferring that culture similarities are not necessary for the soccer player’s
decision to migrate.
Furthermore, I introduce the taxation variable in Columns (2) to (5). The sample decreases
because tax data are only available for 14 destination countries instead of the 21 in Column (1).
The sign of the taxation coefficient is negative in most regressions, and not significant (Columns
(2) to (5). Columns (1) to (3) show that polity is not significant, but it is positive and significant
at 5% in Columns (4) and (5). The explanation for this result is that Columns (1) to (3) include
only European countries of origin, while Columns (4) and (5) include countries from all over the
world as origin. The intuition behind this result can be that a soccer player originating from
an EU country could face similar institutional quality across EU countries. Conversely, for a
football player who originates from a developing country, better institutions can improve his
living conditions.
The Bosman dummy is one of the most important variables. It is significant and positive.
The coefficient is 0.7 on average in all regressions, which means that the Bosman rule leads to an
increase of 7% of migration flows on average. It is important to observe that this coefficient varies
across the different sub-samples, lies between 0.48 to 1, and remains significant at 5%.
Furthermore, when analyzing the large sample covering the 1978 to 1994 EU-to-EU countries
and the 1994 to 2010 all-to-EU countries, I split the Bosman dummy into two dummies: Bosman
EU-to-EU (BosmanEU ) and the Bosman non-EU-to-EU (BosmanNonEU ), to investigate whether
the Bosman rule creates differential effects depending on the soccer player’s country of origin.
Column 5 shows that both dummies are significant and positive. The coefficient ofBosmanNonEU
is slightly higher than the coefficient ofBosmanEU (0.88 versus 0.62). A Wald test on the difference
of coefficients between BosmanEU and BosmanNonEU dummies (Column 5) shows that the two
coefficients are not statistically different.9
The last issue to be explored is the investigation of the existence of reverse causality between
the prestige ratio and migration flows. Comparing Poisson and IV-Poisson regressions, the Wald
test shows that there is no significant evidence for reverse causality. The explanation of no en-
dogeneity can be because prestige qjt depends on the sum of Nijt (
∑
iNijt), which was the total
number of talented players employed in the league, as defined in the Eq. (2). This means that
each Nijt of Eq. (9) accounted, on average, for 1/65th of the
∑
iNijt. Thus, endogeneity is small
to be detected and the Wald test is not significant.
[Insert Table 1]
9In the Web appendix, I provide a falsification test generating fake Bosman between 1986 and 1998. Then, I include
each fake Bosman dummy in Eq. (9) to investigate whether it affects migration decisions. I find that the Bosman rule was
an unexpected event.
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4.2.2 League Production Function.
Table 2 reports the estimation results of Eq. (10). All regressions include full sets of country-fixed
effects and year dummies. Moreover, I control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, and I
report the clustered standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) provides OLS-FE results for two
different groups. Column (1) includes all European leagues, and Column (2) includes European
and Eastern European leagues. Columns (3) to (5) provide the results of the IV method using
different groups. Column (3) illustrated the results of the full group.For robustness, Column (4)
contains the estimation results with only the 21 European leagues, excluding countries from the
ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia. In the end, Column (5) includes all European leagues. For Columns
(3) to (5), I use the 2SLS estimation technique with the lags of ln ljt as internal instruments and ex-
ogenous instruments as per Feyer (2009) (see Column 5) as I explain in the identification strategy
of league production.
Most regressions explain more than 69% of the variation in observed league performance. In
all variants, there is a significant and positive impact on the number of talented players on the
league’s performance. Precisely, if the number of migrants increases by 1%, the league’s perfor-
mance increases by 0.54% on average. This coefficient is less than 1 and shows that the technology
is a concave transformation. Thus, there are decreasing returns to scale in the production function.
Furthermore, the Hausman test shows evidence of endogeneity. Consequently, IV regressions are
preferable to OLS-FE. Additionally, my regressions fulfill the two necessary conditions for instru-
mentation. Since Cragg-Donald cannot be strictly valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity, I use
the "rule of thumb" of an F-stat above 10 to test for the presence of weak instruments. In all first
stage regressions, F-stats are always above 10 in Columns (2) to (5). In other words, not all pos-
sible instruments (internal and external) are weak. Moreover, the Cumby-Huizinga test shows
no evidence of serial correlation for the regressions that uses lags as instruments (see Columns
(3)–(4)).
4.2.3 National Team Production Function
Table 3 illustrates the results of the estimation of Eq. (12). It shows that the total quantity of talent
in efficiency units (i.e., the total number of talented players weighted by the performance of the
league of employment) is significant and positive in all columns under different samples and
methodologies. In Column (1), the coefficient was very low (0.08) using OLS-FE. I also use 2SLS
to solve the endogeneity problem in Eq. (12). The first two lags of lnLit are used as instruments
to solve the endogeneity problem (see Column (3)). I also use the external instrument of Feyrer
(2009) to solve the endogeneity issue in a different way (see Column (2)). The Hausman test shows
evidence of endogeneity in Columns (2) and (3). Consequently, the IV regression is preferable to
OLS-FE. The two necessary conditions for instrumentation are thus fulfilled in the regressions.
The elasticity in the IV regressions increases on average to 0.3 compared to the OLS-FE estimation.
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The Cumby-Huizinga test shows that there is no evidence of serial correlation when I use lags as
instruments (see Column (3)).
[Insert Table 3]
4.2.4 Training Equation
Table 4 reports the results of OLS, IV, and Arellano-Bond (1991) regressions for the main variables
of interest. Columns (1) and (2) show that the lagged level had a significant and negative impact
on the growth rate of talented players. This is in line with Column (3), which shows that the
absolute value of 1 + β0 is lower than 1, implying that the training process is stable and predicts
monotonic (conditional) convergence of the number of talented players in the long run. For OLS
regression, which is illustrated in Column (1), the speed of convergence is around 0.69. As a
result, it takes around 1 period to reach long-run equilibrium. Column (3) shows the Arellano-
Bond results. The coefficient of the lagged term, ∆ lnNi,t−1, is around 0.43 and highly significant.
Therefore, the speed of convergence is about 0.59 per period. It takes 1.17 periods to reach the
country-specific steady state when the explanatory variables are kept constant.
In all regressions, the effect of the Bosman rule on the growth rate of talented players in Africa,
Central and South America is positive and significant. In these regions, the incentives to acquire
skills have increased since the globalization shock. On the contrary, no such incentive effect is
evident for European and Asian countries. Moreover, the incentive effect for the BA group (Ar-
gentina and Brazil) is negative but not significant.The explanation behind this finding could be
that the market of Argentinian and Brazilian players was already liquid before Bosman rule and
so a young player in these countries did not see his incentives change much after this rule. The
elasticities are robust to the specification and estimation method. The GMM estimation in Col-
umn (3) gives the most accurate estimated coefficients. As observed, the largest incentive effect
was in Latin American countries (elasticity of 0.70), followed by Africa and Central America (elas-
ticities of 0.66 and 0.59, respectively). Precisely, the number of talented players in South American
countries (except Brazil and Argentina) has increased by two times because of the Bosman rule.
I use the lags for the number of talented players as instruments and, in the last column, I instru-
ment training using its lag. The two necessary conditions for instrumentation were fulfilled by
the regression in Column (2). Since the Cragg-Donald test is not strictly valid in the presence of
heteroscedasticity, I use the "rule of thumb" of an F-stat above 10 to test for the presence of weak
instruments. This condition is fulfilled, so the instruments could be considered strong. At the
bottom of Column (3), the test of second-order autocorrelation in the residuals shows that there
is no evidence of additional serial correlation. Furthermore, the Hansen J-test shows that over-
identification restrictions are not rejected. The polity variable is not significant in columns, and
the training variable has a positive coefficient and it is significant only in Column 3.
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4.3 Parameters and Algorithm
It is necessary to provide a quantitative analysis to identify and quantify the effects of the Bosman
rule on inequality and efficiency. The main reason to perform this analysis is that previous estima-
tions show that the Bosman rule has the differential impact on training incentives across nations.
For instance, it did not spur training in countries in Europe, Asia, Argentina, and Brazil. Ad-
ditionally, the magnitude of the incentive effect varies across the other regions. Moreover, most
countries are both sending emigrants and receiving immigrants, which lead the Bosman rule ef-
fect to have ambiguous consequences for cross-country inequality and efficiency.
Calibration. The main coefficients of interest for the migration equation are the elasticity of
migration to prestige, δ, and the effect of the Bosman dummy, λ. The estimate for δ is around 0.7,
and those for λ from 0.65 to 1. I use the value of 0.7 for δ and the average value of 0.77 for λ. I use a
single value of the Bosman dummy for all the countries of origin because the Wald test shows that
there is no significant difference between the BosmanEU and BosmannonEU dummies. I also use
a value of 0.53 for γ, the elasticity of the leagues’ score to the number of talented players (Column
(5) in Table 2), and a value of 0.2 for φ, the elasticity of national teams’ score to the total amount
of skills (Column 3 in Table 3). For the training equation, I employ the estimated coefficients from
Column 3 in Table 4. In particular, I set the 1 + β0 for the lagged number of talented players at
0.41 and the region-specific coefficients for the incentive effect, ϕ, at 0.66 for Africa, 0.71 for South
America, 0.59 for North and Central America, and 0 for the other regions. Parameter values are
summarized in Table 5.
Simulation Algorithm. The algorithm’s structure is as follows: first, the training trajectory is
simulated as if the Bosman rule has never been implemented; subsequently, the equations for
interdependencies between migration decisions and leagues’ scores 1998 to 2010 are solved. To do
this, I build a Gauss-Seidel "shooting" algorithm: each iteration I starts with a set of 309 guesses,
q̃Iit ∀ i, t, for the leagues’ scores. I plug these guesses into the migration equation to simulate
the counterfactual allocation of talented players across countries. I then use these inputs for the
production functions and compute the solution for the leagues’ scores, q̄Iij,t. I iterate these until
the solution coincide with the guesses: the next iteration I + 1 starts with a new set of guesses,
q̃I+1it = ηq̃
I
it+(1−η)q̄Iit, where 1−η is the correction factor. I use η= 0.95. The algorithm stops when
the sum of errors (in absolute values) falls below a convergence threshold:
∑
i,t |q̃Iit − q̄Iit| < ε.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
4.4 Impact of Bosman rule in Inequality and Efficiency
In this subsection, I analyze the Bosman rule’s effects on inequality, efficiency, and scores of Euro-
pean leagues, and compare the trajectory with those obtained from the simulation of the situation
without the adoption of the Bosman rule. Moreover, I present the Bosman rule’s effects on in-
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equality, efficiency, and scores of national teams.10
Efficiency and Inequality for European Leagues. First, I investigate the Bosman rule’s overall effect
on the efficiency and inequality indices computed for the 23 European leagues. Figure 1 shows
that the Gini and Theil indices increased around 25% and 33%, respectively, from 1998 to 2010.
Figure 1 also presents the Bosman rule’s effect on inequality (Gini index) and efficiency (average
score of European leagues) from 1994 to 2010. I report the difference between the observed and
the "no-Bosman" trajectories as percentages of the no-Bosman values between 1994 and 2010. It
shows that the Bosman rule has led to a sharp short-run increase in the Gini index (+24% in 1998)
and a slightly larger long-run effect. In 2010, the Gini index was 28% greater than in the no-
Bosman case. I conclude that the Bosman rule explained the entire rise in inequality observed
in European football over the past 15 years. It is also apparent that the Bosman rule increases
European soccer’s efficiency. However, the effect is gradual. The European leagues’ average
score increases by 3% in 1998 and by 8% in 2010. The figure illustrates that efficiency increases
at a lower rate over the 1998 to 2010 period. Additionally, the efficiency of the total number of
talented players increased by 15% in 1998 and by 22% in 2010. This globalization shock leads to
an improvement in the quality of European football and increases disparities between major and
minor leagues.
[Insert Figure 1].
Efficiency and Inequality for National Teams. The results for efficiency (average score of national
teams) and inequality (Gini index) are presented in Figure 2, which shows the effect of the Bosman
rule from 1994 to 2010. The differences between the observed and no-Bosman trajectories are
presented as percentages of the no-Bosman values between 1994 and 2010. Similar to the leagues,
I observe that the national teams’ efficiency increased after the Bosman rule. The rise is sharp in
1998 (+15%) and subsequently slower until 2010 (+20% during the total period).
Contrary to the results obtained for the leagues, the Bosman rule reduces inequality between
national teams. There is a dramatic drop in the Gini index of around 15% in 1998. I observe the
largest reduction in 2002 (45%), confirming it with the 2002 World Cup results. Almost half of
the teams in the last round of 16 teams are non-EU: South Korea, Japan, Senegal, Paraguay, and
Mexico. It is the first time that this phenomenon occurred in the World Cup’s history. Non-EU
countries performed well during the 2010 World Cup held in South Africa, but to a lesser extent.
[Insert Figure 2]
10In the Web appendix, I provide a similar analysis of the effects of the Bosman rule’s effects on the rankings of European
leagues and national teams.
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4.5 Robustness Analysis
4.5.1 Exogenous and Endogenous Number of Players
Hitherto, I considered the effects of the Bosman rule in training decisions in my football economy.
I define the model incorporating endogenous training decisions as the benchmark model. For
robustness analysis, I test one alternative model for the quantitative experiment: the baseline
model with an exogenous number of talents, which I compare with the benchmark model. I also
define two scenarios to examine the simulation results as follows.
• Scenario 1: Benchmark Model
• Scenario 2: Benchmark Model with an Exogenous Number of Talents, ϕ=0 of Eq. (15).
Efficiency and Inequality of European Leagues. Figures 3a and 3b present the European league’s effi-
ciency and inequality from 1994 to 2010 in the two scenarios defined above. In Figure 3b, I notice
that inequality and efficiency increase over time in all scenarios. The efficiency increases less in
Scenario 2 than in 1. Consequently, I infer that the greater production of talent in developing
countries and their emigration to Europe are key factors explaining the rise in European football
efficiency/quality. Regarding the inequality between European leagues, Figure 3a shows that in-
equality increases similarly in all scenarios. This result suggests that the incentive mechanisms
play a minor role in explaining the rising inequality.
[Insert Figure 3]
Efficiency and Inequality of National Teams. Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the national teams’ ef-
ficiency and inequality from 1994 to 2010. For the analysis of European leagues, I compare effi-
ciency and inequality between the two scenarios. The inequality falls at a slower pace in Scenario
2 than in 1 (see Figure 4a). I thus conclude that the incentive to train in poor regions and the
migration of these talented players in high-quality leagues are the main reasons for the sharp de-
crease in inequality across the national teams. Note that there is an increase in efficiency after the
Bosman rule’s introduction in all scenarios. Figures 4a and 4b together show that my results and
conclusions for inequality and efficiency in the benchmark model are robust.
[Insert Figure 4]
5 Conclusions
Complex interactions between highly skilled migration and aggregate performance govern the
dynamics of growth and inequality across nations. Due to the lack of data, the economic and
migration literature have insufficiently studied these interdependencies. I benefit from the avail-
ability of a unique data set on European football and the unexpected elimination of mobility
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restrictions (the Bosman rule) in 1995 to analyze the links between talent migration and cross-
country inequality. I develop a simple model and estimate its parameters. Then, I conduct a
simulation analysis, compare the actual data to a counterfactual no-mobility restriction trajectory.
The elimination of mobility barriers increases both cross-country inequality by 25%, and global
output by 12%. The latter occurs, via the stimulation of production of new talents in Africa, Latin
and Central America. Finally, the results indicate that Bosman rule decreases the inequality across
the national teams by 70%.
Although the football labor market is a specific market, the results of this analysis provide
an upper bound on the migration response to inequality for the global economy. If developed
countries relax restrictions on highly-skilled immigration, the model developed in this study pre-
dicts greater inequality on a development level (as measured by GDP per capita), lower inequal-
ity in income per natural11, and higher efficiency on a global level. The latter effect would be
consequence of an increasing of production of talents by less developed regions due to stronger
incentives to invest in education after the removal of quotas.
For further research, it would be interesting in investigating the evolution of inequality within
European leagues. Presumably, it is expected to be increased since the richest clubs had now
access to a larger pool of talents than before the Bosman rule. However, it is ambiguous as to
whether the inequality within a league spurs productivity or no. Moreover,it is also crucial to
explore whether a more unequal league is more or less appealing to the public than a more egal-
itarian league, given that other sports (like NBA league in Basketball) seek to make their leagues
more equal and, thus, make games more exciting.
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Appendices
A Figures
Figure 1: Effect of Bosman rule on Inequality and Efficiency among European Leagues
Note: The figure describes the inequality and efficiency across the years 1994 to 2010. GINI index and the leagues’ score
of Bosman trajectory are compared to those of the no-Bosman trajectory.
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Figure 2: Effect of Bosman rule on Inequality and Efficiency among National Teams
The figure describes the national teams’ inequality and efficiency across the years 1994 to 2010. The GINI index and the
leagues’ score of Bosman distribution are compared to those of the no-Bosman distribution.
Figure 3: Inequality and Efficiency for European Leagues
figure(3a) figure(3b)
Note: Figure 3a illustrates the inequality of European leagues under two scenarios. Scenario 1: benchmark model. Sce-
nario 2: benchmark model with exogenous number of talented players. The GINI index of Bosman distribution is com-
pared to that of the no-Bosman rule distribution. Figure 3b illustrates the efficiency of European leagues under two
scenarios. Scenario 1: benchmark model. Scenario 2 : benchmark model with exogenous number of talents. Leagues’
score of Bosman distribution is compared to that of the no-Bosman rule distribution. .
26
Figure 4: Inequality and Efficiency of National Teams
figure(4a) figure(4b)
Note: Figure 4a illustrates the national teams’ inequality under two scenarios. Scenario 1: benchmark model. Scenario 2:
benchmark model with exogenous number of talented players. The Gini index of Bosman distribution is compared to that
of the no-Bosman rule distribution Figure 4b illustrates the European leagues’ efficiency under two scenarios. Scenario 1:
benchmark model. Scenario 2: benchmark model with exogenous number of talented players. National score of Bosman
distribution is compared to that of the no-Bosman rule distribution
B Tables
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Table 1: Determinants of migration in soccer
Dependent Variable: Migrants/stayers ratio(logs)
EU x EU sample All to EU sample
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Colonial links -0.023 0.272 0.273 -0.219 -0.223
(0.290) (0.438) (0.319) (0.379) (0.379)
Linguistic proximity -0.153 -1.57 -0.194 -0.690 -0.688
(0.191) (0.200) (0.144) (0.400) (0.40)
Leagues’ score ratio(logs) 0.427a 0.431b 1.318b 0.491a 0.444a
(0.152) (0.160) (0.634) (0.132) (0.127)
Distance (logs) -2.138a -2.105a -2.158a -3.691a -3.691a
(0.138) (0.151) (0.106) (0.245) (0.245)
wages ratio (logs) 0.886b 0.927c 0.8200c 1.216b 1.277b
(0.433) (0.520) (0.52) (0.579) (0.619)
Bosman dummy 0.411b 0.454b 0.552b 1.034a
(0.157) (0.220) (0.177) (0.225)
Taxation -0.407 -0.152 -0.364 -0.410
(0.432) (0.437) (0.621) (0.621)
polity 0.052 0.053 0.071 2.274a 2.250a





Constant 13.11a 11.53a 10.598a -4.111 -5.550
(3.31) (2.773) (3.905) (6.244) (6.28)
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No
Bspline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years 1978-2010 1978-2010 1978-2010 1978-2010 1978-2010
Method Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson Poisson
N 3154 2656 2191 4340 4340
R2 0.55 0.52 0.62 0.61 0.61
P-value of Wald test for exogeneity 0.5943
P-value of Wald test for different coefficients 0.278
Note: Standard errors clustered by country origin and destination in parentheses a, b and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The dependent
variable in all the columns is Migrants/stayers ratio(logs). In Column 1, Eq.9 is estimated using the method of PPML for the sample 1978-2010 for European
Countries to 21 European destination countries. Column 2 uses PPML method for the estimation of Eq.9 for the sample 1978-2010 for European countries including
the variable of taxation(the number of destination countries falls to 14). Column 3 estimates the Eq.9 for the sample 1978-2010 using IV-poisson. Column 4 estimates
Eq.9 using PPML including All to EU sample. Column 5 estimates Eq.9 using PPML including All to EU sample splitting the Bosman dummy to BosmanEU
BosmanNONEU
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Table 2: Estimation of the production function of leagues
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log league’s score log league’s score log league’s score log league’s score log league’s score
number of talents(logs) 0.121b 0.110a 0.467a 0.611a 0.590a
(0.050) (0.033) (0.162) (0.166) (0.025)
Constant -0.195 -0.508a 0.785 1.614a 1.420 a
(0.191) (0.183) (0.170) (0.580) (0.146)
Country fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 185 254 140 185 183
R-square 0.82 0.85 0.71 0.70 0.68
Method OLS OLS IV IV IV
F-test of first regression 28.59 13.07 14.10
Cragg-Donald test 28.59 20.1 22.05
Hausman test 10.2 6.32 10.2
p-value 0.0016 0.016 0.0046
Cumby-Huizinga test for autocorrelation 0.32 0.84
Hansen test 0.3 0.42
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses a , b and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.Talent is defined the soccer player who has at least three
appeareances with his national team. Column 1 estimates Eq.10 using OLS method for the sample UEFA countries without the Eastern European countries.Column 2 estimates Eq.10 using OLS
method for the sample including all the European countries. Column 3 estimates Eq.10 using IV-method for the sample UEFA countries without Eastern European countries. Column 4 estimates
Eq.10 using IV-method for the sample all the European leagues. The first two lags are used as instruments for the variable number of migrants (logs)Column 5 estimates Eq.10 using IV-method
for the sample UEFA countries without Eastern European countries using an exogenous instrument following the methodology of Feyrer (2009).
Table 3: Estimation of the production function of national teams
(1) (2) (3)
national score (logs) national score (logs) national score (logs)
Total level of skills (logs) 0.084b 0.733b 0.150a
(0.039) (0.384) (0.04)
constant -0.601a -0.506a -0.420
(0.0636) (0.212) (0.110)
Country fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 309 186 304
R-square 0.75 0.75 0.63
F-test of first regression 11.5 50
Cragg-Donald test 39.5 121
Cumby-Huizinga test for autocorrelation(p-value) 0.10
Hansen test 0.90
Notes:Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses a , b and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Column 1 and 3 estimates Eq. 12 using OLS and IV
method, The first two lags are used as instruments for the variable Total level of skills (logs).Column 2 estimates Eq. 12 using OLS by disentangle the total level of skills into Average skills for
talents and Number of talents.Last column estimates Eq. 12 using IV method with instrument following the methodology of Feyrer (2009).
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Table 4: Training for soccer players(Dependent :Variation in Number of talented players)
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged number of talents(logs) -0.690a -0.841c
(0.056) (0.474)
Lagged variation in Number of talents (logs) 0.435a
(0.128)
Bosman x Europe -0.020 0.125 0.164
(0.330) (0.150) (0.294)
Bosman x Africa 1.164a 1.04a 0.66b
(0.350) (0.611) (0.324)
Bosman x Asia 0.131 0.368 0.326
(0.218) (0.298) (0.355)
Bosman x Central America 1.033a 1.16a 0.592a
(0.337) (0.570) (0.294)
Bosman x Latin America 1.140a 1.15a 0.706a
(0.330) (0.560) (0.225)
Bosman x B.A -0.208 -0.030 -0.063
(0.185) (0.208) (0.209)
logtrain 0.176 0.437 0.173a
(0.183) (0.514) (0.043)
polity 0.001 0.005 0.014
(0.02) (0.06) (0.0203)
Country fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes






Number of groups 51
Number of Instruments 30
Hansen test 0.11 0.131
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by countries in parentheses a , b and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.Column 1 estimates Eq.16 using OLS method.
Column 2 estimates Eq.16 using IV method. Column 3 estimates Eq.16 using Arellano Bond method. As instruments are used the first two lags of talented players. The number of instruments is
30 and number of groups is 51.
Table 5: Calibrated values
Coefficients values
λ 0.77
γ 0.53
δ 0.7
ϕAfrica 0.66
ϕNorth−CentralAmerica 0.59
ϕSouthAmerica 0.71
ϕEurope−Asia−BA 0
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